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It is argued that European integration has not fulfi lled its chief economic promises. Output growth 
has been increasingly weak and unstable. Productivity growth has been following a decreasing 
trend. Income inequalities, both within and between the EU member states, have been rising. This 
sorry state of affairs is likely to continue – and likely to precipitate further exits, or eventually, the 
dissolution of the Union. However, this outcome is not unavoidable. A better integration in the EU 
is possible, at least in theory. Also, the negative consequences implicit in the existence of the com-
mon currency could be neutralised. However, the basic paradigms of the economic policies to be 
followed in the EU would have to be radically changed. First, the unconditional fi scal consolidation 
provisions still in force would have to be repelled. Second, “beggar-thy-neighbour” (or mercantil-
ist) wage policies would have to be “outlawed”. 
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1. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS PROMISES
Under the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, European economic integration 
has been further advanced. The introduction of the euro crowned the process of 
the internal liberalisation of trade within the EU and facilitated the creation of an 
area of ever freer movements of capital, labour, and services throughout the con-
tinent. There are many possible measures of advances in economic integration. 
Perhaps the most unproblematic of these measures is the share of mutual trade 
in the EU aggregate GDP. Figure 1 shows the mutual exports as a percentage of 
euro area (EU-12) GDP since 1960.
Economic integration (just as internal economic liberalisation or globalisation) 
is generally assumed to be conducive to economic growth (even if it is now often 
admitted that it may have unwelcome – but transient – distributional effects). 
Tighter integration has been expected to promote faster overall productivity 
growth, for example through increased competition and more efficient utilisation 
of scarce resources. 
The European integration has failed to deliver on these promises. Economic 
growth has been slowing down secularly, since approximately the mid-1970s 
(Figure 2). Growth rates follow a declining trend, which – if continued – would 
push the EU-12 into permanent recession. In addition, growth has become in-
creasingly volatile, with violent ups and downs, and recessions climaxing around 
1993, 2003,  2009, and 2012. One may bear in mind that the short-lived reces-
sions in 1975 and 1981 could have been the aftermaths of the oil embargoes 
(1974, 1979) and the associated shortages severely affecting the “supply side”. 
Beyond such shortages materially affecting production, the oil shocks had nega-
tive consequences for inflation, income distribution, and – especially – private 
investment.1 
The deep slumps in 1993 and 2009 cannot yet be viewed as “exogenous 
shocks”. These slumps were “endogenous”. They were the consequences of the 
economic “architecture” consciously designed by the European economic elites. 
In 1993, the recession was the consequence of the crash of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism; in 2009, it was the near-collapse of the EU’s financial sector op-
erating by the rules enacted by the EU policy-makers. It may be added that the 
second-dip recession of 2012 was provoked by the “fiscal consolidation” hys-
1  Actions by the OPEC cartel produced fundamental uncertainty: would the energy prices/
supplies be allowed to return to “normal” levels, or would they rather stay at “abnormal” levels 
more or less indefinitely? Under such uncertainty, the best approach to taking (irreversible) 
investment decisions (involving technology choice: energy saving, or traditional) could be of 
a wait-and-see sort.
ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION OF THE EU 51
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
Figure 1. Intra-EU exports as a percentage of EU-12 GDP
Source: AMECO.
Figure 2. Growth rates of real per capita GDP for EU-12 and Germany
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO, item RVGDP.
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teria gripping the euro area decision-makers. Finally, it is worth observing that 
the introduction of the euro (since 1998) and the full internal trade liberalisation 
(Single European Market, since 1993) did nothing to accelerate and smooth out 
GDP growth. 
Is the weakening labour productivity growth responsible for the slowdown 
of output growth?
Labour productivity has also followed a declining trend (Figure 3). This outcome 
is usually considered a paradox. A number of commentators and researchers have 
pondered on the ongoing productivity growth slowdown. Given the (apparent) 
acceleration of technological progress and the rather obvious advances in applied 
research and innovation activities, the labour productivity growth slowdown is 
considered a paradox. The solutions to the paradox sometimes forwarded suggest 
that output (and productivity) have been systematically underestimated by the 
statistics (e.g. Mokyr 2014, or Feldstein 2015). Others tend to disagree with the 
mismeasurement thesis without yet offering a coherent explanation of the para-
dox (e.g. Byrne et al. 2016).  
Gordon (2015) is the most vocal representative of the “supply-siders” who 
suggest that the technological progress has not prevented the weakening of labour 
productivity growth. He then goes as far as to blame the post-2008 stagnation 
itself on the slower growth (since 2004) in potential output “emanating from the 
Figure 3. Real productivity (GDP per employed person) growth rate for EU-12
Source: AMECO.
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behaviour of productivity”. The implication of this seems to be that the supply 
side needs further “structural reforms”, stronger deregulation, more labour mar-
ket flexibility, etc., so as to strengthen productivity growth and thus contribute to 
the faster growth of output.
However, the results of an econometric examination of the links between la-
bour productivity and output growth for 22 countries (for which long-term data 
are available), for West Germany (years 1960 through 1991), for unified Ger-
many (years 1991–2015), and also for a larger set of countries (years 1991, or 
1995, through 2015) indicate that, generally, productivity does not “cause” output 
(Podkaminer 2016). Much more often, the causation seems to be running in the 
opposite direction: from output (or its growth rate) to productivity (or its growth 
rate). This finding, though inconsistent with the “mainstream” ideas on the sourc-
es of long-term economic growth, is reminiscent of the classical Kaldor – Ver-
doorn Law (Kaldor 1966). The progressing slowdown in output growth at the 
global level, initiated in the mid-1970s (amid the wholesale change of economic 
policy paradigms), may have been mirrored – and followed – by the progressive 
slowdown in productivity growth (and that despite the indisputable acceleration 
of technological progress). Productivity growth slowdown cannot be the cause of 
the overall slowdown of output growth in the EU.
Is an excessive degree of income redistribution the problem? 
Can it be that productivity and output growth slowdown has been the price for 
increased income convergence – greater income equality? The answer is no. The 
dispersion of per capita incomes across the EU member states has been increas-
ing (Figure 4). One observes sigma-divergence instead of sigma-convergence. In 
terms of per capita income, the “old” EU has shown divergence rather than con-
vergence (excluding a brief period of the recession-related income convergence 
in 2009). The same is true for the extended EU. 
The increase in income inequality has been even more pronounced in individ-
ual EU member states: “It is the within-country, not the between-country dimen-
sion, which appears to be most important. Inequality in Europe has risen quite 
substantially since the mid 1980s” (Bonesmo Fredriksen 2012: 2).2
2  It is rather obvious that the growth slowdown cannot be attributed to the intensified shortages 
of labour: unemployment has been high since the early 1980s. Neither can it be attributed 
to intensified shortages of exhaustible natural resources. The continuing secular decline in 
commodities’ terms-of-trade indicates that commodities are becoming less scarce, not more 
(see e.g. Mollick et al. 2008).
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Central and East European new member states: trapped in integration 
The economic history of the Central and East European new member states of EU 
is still quite short. Nonetheless, the economic growth of these countries – under 
progressing integration into the EU – is not really impressive. The post-acces-
sion boom (2003 through 2007) was fairly short and ended in deep recession 
(Figure 5). The post-recession growth has been anaemic. There are good reasons 
to expect their growth to be rather slow in the future (Podkaminer 2015a). These 
countries have come to depend, economically, on the West European core (pri-
marily Germany). The pace (and sources) of their economic growth have been 
adjusting to those of Germany. In the medium term, they will not grow much 
faster than Germany – and the German economy is very likely to stagnate. 
2. THE REASONS OF THE FAILURE
For some authors, the economic failure of the EU can be directly attributed to 
the principles first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and later reiterated in a 
series of fiscal compacts or pacts. Combined with the common currency (and the 
common monetary policy embodying the tradition of German central banking), 
the Maastricht fiscal rules have eventually suppressed output growth, generated 
Figure 4.  Standard deviation of per capita gross national income (in 1000 PPS), 
population-weighted
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO (item HVGNP). 
Note: EA = Euro Area (12 countries).
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internal imbalances – and thus paved the ground for the internal economic disin-
tegration of the Union (Laski – Podkaminer 2012). 
The vicious dynamics behind the developing economic drama can be con-
cisely described as follows. First to come is the set of fiscal rules setting narrow 
limits for public sector deficits. The fiscal rules are to apply universally – without 
regard for national specificities. Thus a country (such as Germany) which is ca-
pable of producing output in excess of the needs of its private sector (be it private 
consumption or private investment) cannot rely on the public sector to absorb the 
excess private sector savings by means of deficit spending. It is thus left with no 
other easy option than to run trade surpluses. For such a country, running trade 
surpluses becomes a way of supporting domestic growth (and of keeping its own 
unemployment in check). Of course, for a country to be capable of running trade 
surpluses there must be some countries capable of running trade deficits. It is 
understood that for countries running trade deficits this implies not only accumu-
lation of foreign debt – but also the suppression of domestic output growth and 
additional unemployment (to be associated with persistent fiscal deficits). 
At this stage, it is important to consider the way the common currency facili-
tates the rise of cross-country imbalances. One currency, one monetary policy, 
and one policy interest rate have very different economic implications for vari-
ous members of the same group. The policy interest rate has been tuned to the 
average inflation rate calculated for the whole area. That would be fine if infla-
tion (and inflation histories) were similar across the whole area. But in fact, they 
are different. In consequence, for countries with inflation persistently higher 
Figure 5. Real rates of growth of output per capita for the 10 NMS
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO, item RVGDP.
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than the average, the real interest rates have tended to be low (or even nega-
tive) while – at the same time – the real interest rates may be prohibitively high 
in countries with much lower inflation. As Figure 6 shows, until 2008, the real 
interest rates in Germany were consistently higher than elsewhere. Of course, 
such differential developments favouring Germany’s partners could not persist 
indefinitely. As soon as the boom supported by low real interest rates collapsed 
(under the weight of accumulated domestic and foreign debts), the real interest 
rates in countries that had higher inflation became high (in many cases exces-
sively high). It is at this stage that the initial boom turned into recession.   
The moral to this story is that the principle “one size fits all” does not work 
in practice. The common monetary policy has been destabilising growth and in-
flation: strengthening inflation (and growth) in countries experiencing a boom, 
while suppressing inflation (and growth) in countries experiencing deflation and 
output slump. Importantly, as the consequence of differential developments in 
real interest rates (and inflation), the countries with traditionally low inflation 
(and, consequently, weak growth in wages (such as Germany) have been gaining 
cost-competitiveness advantages vs. their higher-inflation partners (Figure 7). 
That way the low-inflation (and weak-growth) countries have become reli-
ant on ever rising trade surpluses – while the higher-inflation countries that had 
earlier priced themselves out of international competition have been forced to 
reduce their trade deficits (Figure 8) – as a rule goes hand in hand with persisting 
depression (or even recession).
Figure 6. Real long-term interest rates (spread over Germany)
Source: AMECO, item ILRV.
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Is a better integration in the EU possible?
A better integration in the EU is possible, at least in theory. Also, the negative 
consequences implicit in the existence of the common currency could be neutral-
ised. However, the basic paradigms of the economic policies to be followed in the 
EU would have to be radically changed (Laski – Podkaminer 2012). 
Figure 7. Nominal unit labour costs
Source: AMECO, item PLCD.
Figure 8. Net external lending as a percentage of GDP
Source: AMECO, item UBLA.
58 LEON PODKAMINER
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
Two closely related aspects are of crucial importance: first, the rejection of the 
unconditional fiscal consolidation provisions still in force; second, the prohibi-
tion of “beggar-thy-neighbour” (or mercantilist) wage policies. 
The latter issue is obviously important because unduly restrictive wage poli-
cies which consequently lead to large trade surpluses not only suppress growth 
in countries which fail to follow suit (and thus run trade deficits and accumulate 
foreign debts), but also because the suppressed wages (as e.g. in Germany or Aus-
tria) are responsible for overall weak growth in countries implementing the inter-
nal “wage moderation” strategy. In practice, the “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy 
is also a “beggar-thyself” policy (Laski – Podkaminer 2011).
Rejection of the unconditional fiscal consolidation provisions is equally im-
portant for countries (again, such as Germany) whose private sector tends, on a 
permanent basis, to save much in excess of its own investment. Without the abil-
ity to run trade surpluses (but which never can be sustained indefinitely), such 
countries must either experience depression, or allow public sector deficits to 
absorb the excessive private savings (Laski – Podkaminer 2013).
3. GLOBALISATION IS NOT HELPFUL
Sometimes, there have been allusions to the possibility (and even desirability) 
of each and all EU member states taking over the German economic policy of 
repressed wages, balanced public finances, and sizeable trade surpluses (neces-
sarily vs. the rest of the world). This proposition is an economic mirage if only 
because it stipulates the existence of a global economy capable of indebting it-
self to the EU indefinitely. Otherwise, the EU acting internationally as a much 
greater Germany is unlikely to be accepted by the United States. Very likely, the 
latter country would retaliate in kind, or adopt protectionist measures. Besides, 
the economic strategy relying on repressed wages (and thus repressed domestic 
demand) guarantees weak overall output growth (as the bulk of GDP consists of 
non-tradable domestically produced goods and services).
Expectation that the outside world – especially in the conditions of advancing 
globalisation – is somehow capable of helping the European integration is not 
well grounded. In actual fact, the whole global economy is suffering from a ma-
laise that is not very much different from the one affecting Europe. Progressing 
globalisation turns out to have been associated with the growth of global output 
becoming progressively weaker and more unstable (Figure 9). 
Expanding world trade has failed to accelerate global growth. Rather, the ex-
panding trade may be argued to have contributed to the output growth slowdown 
(Podkaminer 2014). The possible reasons for the unexpected (but econometrical-
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ly well-grounded) conclusions are partly similar as in the EU’s case. First, under 
progressing capital account liberalisation individual countries are quite likely to 
run trade surpluses (or deficits) much longer than would be possible under less 
free capital movements. This makes the growth process much more unstable. 
Second, under progressing trade liberalisation, there is a tendency for countries 
to engage in wage and tax competition. Individual countries try to outsmart the 
competitors. But when all engage in the race to the bottom, no-one is going to 
win – and all are likely to lose.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARK
The existence of the European Union is of vital importance to the Europeans – 
and especially for the Central and East European countries. Without the EU, these 
nations would once again find themselves alone, in a grey zone between their all 
too mighty neighbours. 
But the EU cannot prosper within the confines of self-imposed limitations 
that have little economic justification, theoretical and practical. Unless the basic 
paradigms of economic policy for the EU are overhauled, the EU will remain a 
stagnant area convulsed by recurring economic (and then social and political) 
crises. Sooner or later, these crises will give rise to further exits or would even 
precipitate the dissolution of the Union.  
Figure 9. Global exports/GDP share and the growth rate of global GDP per capita
Source: WDI, items SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD and NE.EXP.GNFS.CD.
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Whether the radical change happens before it is too late is of course highly 
uncertain. In any case, it should be the duty of Central and East European politi-
cians – and also economists – to voice their concerns over the overall orientation 
of the economic policies of the European Union.  
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